Barcelona vs. Osasuna, La Liga Matchday 37: A Fort and Stubborn Soldiers

I’ll begin by thanking you for experimenting with this blog. Touchline Theory is a concept that I’ve considered spearheading for months, and I’m delighted to be assembling our first match analysis, ever. I certainly hope that there will be many more to come.

This article is inspired by many of the readings I’ve done in lockdown, including David Sumpter’s Soccermatics, Michael Cox’s Zonal Marking, Jonathan Wilson’s Inverting the Pyramid, and more. I’ve been exceedingly impressed with the precision and insight from pieces like Moritz Kossmann’s “Taking over Betis” for Spielverlagerung, YouTube channels like The Coaches’ Voice, and podcasts like Caught Offside and The Modern Soccer Coach. With so many bright people studying the nuances of this field, I felt compelled to try my hand at the trade, so feel free to let me know what you think. I’ve spent some time collecting ideas, and while this is a single-person effort for the time being, I’ll be looking to produce as much material in as consistent of a time frame as possible. All the while, I’ll hope to keep as open of a general mindset as I can, in an effort to avoid the effects of psychological priming on my perceptions of the unfolding play. I’m certainly more familiar with some teams than others, but that ought not bias my thinking!

Regarding this analysis, I wish to highlight two software components that I’m trying out this month: NacSport and KlipDraw Animate. Though pretty diagrams in and of themselves shouldn’t suggest futbol wisdom, they can certainly help parse through and annotate 90 minutes of kicking and screaming. As soon as a live pundit begins to finger paint atop a replay, it’s somewhat of a natural tendency to think that we’re receiving some real tactical gold—but I find that this impression often bestows too much respect for our on-air commentators. Arrows and spotlights can be convenient, but only when paired with incisive thinking. Visual tools like KlipDraw are wonderful, but I’ll hope you, as the reader, will draw your focus away from the lovely imagery and be critical of the ideas presented. Just because someone displays a figure, doesn’t mean they know what they’re talking about.

And I don’t think I’m alone in this line of thought. To take a brief example from politics, there was an era in American history in which a movement of “image over substance” for presidential candidates was largely heralded. People running for office became more figure-headed than ever, with increasingly bigger personalities, but less and less policy to back them up. Needless to say, I’m hoping to sidestep this pitfall.

“Drawing/Telestration-tools are a great way to highlight certain aspects. It is easy to get carried away with the possibilities though, which is why it is always important to ask oneself: “What exactly do I wanna show in this clip?” and then go from there. I prefer simplicity in this context, in addition with some information in text.”

Moritz Kossmann in Taking over Betis, Week 1

This segways into my final point before kicking things off: all views here are my own. In the world of sports journalism, I’ve encountered plenty of brash aloofness. Many people have spent years observing the players they follow and have built up a wealth of understanding; others have taken elite coaching courses; others, still, were pros themselves. I’d be both ignorant and arrogant to suggest that my findings are purely objective.

So instead of claiming everything as matter of fact, I’ll do what I can to spark discussion, invite criticism, and ask questions when I don’t know the answers. Mind you, that’s not to say that I’m an idiot either. Touchline Theory is simply a learning project for me, not a pedestal atop which I’m hoping to toot my own horn. I’m truly delighted that you’ve chosen to take a deeper look.

Enough with the preamble! Let’s get on with it!

Overview

On 7/16, Barcelona and Osasuna faced off in what appeared to be a last gasp attempt to stave off Real Madrid’s first La Liga trophy since their first-ever double in 2016/17. Needless to say, Barcelona’s frustrated efforts against the midtable side granted Los Blancos plenty of breathing room in their simultaneous match against Villareal, though the Madrid outfit required no such help in securing the title.

The match was defined by a disciplined and tightly-knit Osasuna setup that started the match with clear intent—a narrow 5-3-2 fort that defiantly proclaimed “come at us”—and the Catalans did. Osasuna’s fullbacks rarely ventured into the wide spaces, and guarded the top of the 18 like a captive princess in a castle. Barcelona were simply unable to rid themselves of their royal fixation, spending most of the 90 driving straight into the heart of the fire. A coordinated line of 3 midfielders ahead of the back 5 shifted in coordination with the ebbs and flows of Barca’s switching, all the while discouraging any progression through the middle of the park. Barcelona’s build-up was largely forced wide, with the two Osasuna strikers playing extremely deep and serving as the tip of the wedge. They formed an impenetrable and daunting 5-man star that outnumbered Puig and Roberto, who struggled to create chances from within it.

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To play around Osasuna’s muddy mess in the middle (we’ll coin the term “MMM” for the purposes of this article), Barcelona repeatedly found its width in unoccupied areas, but the widemen insisted on taking negative touches and cutting inside—directly into the midfield swamp Osasuna had carefully prepared. This refusal to take the vacant wide channels wasn’t aided by Barca’s inverted wingers, and their natural inclination to drift inwards, but we ought not praise in-adaptability. Sun Tzu indicates in his often-cited Art of War, “he who can modify his tactics in relation to the opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain”; this uninspired Barcelona XI looked the furthest thing from heavenly.

Osasuna found delight in closing these central areas. Pep’s false-9 era allowed for Messi to pull back in midfield and dominate the center strip, but with Rakitic playing the pivot base, the internal cohort lacked a certain nostalgic vitality we grow fonder of each passing day. Slow defensive responsiveness, hiding in cover shadows while in possession, and an unwillingness to penetrate vacated halfspaces after switching the field, meant that Barcelona looked sluggish and all too comfortable in non-threatening positions.

A 75^th minute red card for Osasuna hinted at a potential change of fortune, but it bafflingly cemented The Navarre’s successful tactics. Setien brought on De Jong, Busquets, and Vidal to gain control in midfield, Alba to spread Osasuna’s soldiers leftwards, and Suarez for the lackluster Braithwaite. Up a man and with a lineup that, on paper, could challenge Europe’s elite, these introductions added unpredictability but were unable to right the ship. In the 94^th minute, Sergio Busquets’ bizarre backwards header let Osasuna counter with numbers up and put the match to bed. Without a whimper, Barcelona’s title hopes were put fast asleep in a game they’ll be hoping to forget. Let’s get into the details.

Osasuna’s Fortress and Barca’s One-Track Mind

Mourinho set the tone for parking the bus but Osasuna redefined it on Matchday 37. This defensive 5 was a taunting declaration of  coming to terms with the circumstances, as few La Liga sides pose attacking threats with Leo Messi’s volatility.

Inter Milan’s Champion’s League triumph over Guardiola’s Blaugrana in 2010/11 showed us that when confronted with excellence of historical proportions, it’s sometimes best to focus your efforts on caging the beast. Though Osasuna didn’t field Cambiasso and Zannetti, they effectively assembled a glue trap for the flea.

“I remember after the game, the [Italian] press was using a word… ‘Gabbia’… I think the real translation is like a jail. A jail to Messi.”

–Jose Mourinho, on Inter Milan’s Defensive Strategy vs. Barcelona, 2010/11

Unlike the days in which two-footed Neymar would leave opponents guessing by readily attacking vacancies to either side of incoming defenders, the 2020 Barcelona has symbolized forcing square pegs into round holes. Predictability hasn’t been a problem for the likes of Arjen Robben, and arguably Messi either, but the selection of right-footed Ansu Fati as the team’s left winger meant Neymar’s old sideline would largely be in the peripheral. Griezmann’s left-footedness allowed him to bomb down the flanks in his formative years at Real Sociedad, but this wide intensity was hugely missed. More on this later.

Noting Barca’s unwavering inward tilt, Nacho Vidal, the Osasuna RB, rarely stepped beyond the halfspace and into the wide region. This maintained a unit of five more compact than even your average back four. His gift of space to Ansu was to say “go on, take it”, but the youngster’s reluctance to accept the boon meant Vidal grew increasingly comfortable in maintaining close proximity with his center back partners. When Fati consistently chose to cut inside and attack the right back head-on, Vidal welcomed the challenge and was aided by several nearby back-ups that could cover for him in the case of a mistake. Though Bein Sports’ broadcast failed to show it, I’m almost certain that a rubber band must’ve been wrapped around the squadron of disciplined defenders.

Estupinian marauded down the left-hand strip a bit more adventurously, and eventually nabbed himself the game’s first assist, but was tugged in towards the LCB David Garcia in defensive stretches. Though Messi experimented down the right-hand flank with slightly greater frequency, the corners of the pitch were virtually eliminated from the field of play.

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Osasuna’s efforts were highly coordinated. Moncayola frequently directed his fellow pressers of the ball and could often be seen barking marking directions. Strong communication enabled center backs to step high when pressure was needed, and for others to fill in accordingly. The rare occasions in which their second line was more than ten paces ahead of their third resulted in the few moments of penetration for Barcelona. This trend was quickly picked up, and the gap grew smaller as the minutes passed.

With the shrinking space between the lines, opportunities became available in beyond it. One traditional option was to possess high with the winger and dump a vertical ball into the corner for central players trapped between the lines to catch up to. Such an opportunity was available time and time again, as seen in the image below.

By holding the ball in the “build-up zone” with a winger, and having a central man dart into the wide “definition zone”, defenses will become more reluctant to pack themselves so tightly. This combination tends to stretch the fullback high and force a marking decision for the CB in behind: “do I follow into the corner to block the cross, or mark goal-scoring threats inside the box?”

Often, the corner chaser will collect the pass and drive along the byline towards the goal, with the out-of-place fullback hastily in retreat. It is here that we so commonly witness penalties being given up by clever wingers putting their body between the ball and the blindside defender–inviting the overzealous wideback to clumsily clip or collide with the attacker. In the age of VAR, this strategy has become increasingly common, as attackers know that the faintest suggestion of contact will earn them a penalty spot showdown with the keeper. The mental tiredness brought on by COVID-19’s extended play-break has certainly not helped the average defender’s sharpness, either. Just watch Dejan Kulusevski employ this precise movement against Napoli’s Koulibaly to take the late lead a few days ago. K2 is hardly a fool, but Kulusevski’s sharp positioning to get into the box from the corner and draw the foul wins Udinese the victory. Dive or not, the move was effective.

Another pertinent example can be seen by Carvajal’s move against Getafe, only a few days prior. A similar situation in which an exhausted Mathias Olivera sputters into fifth gear trying to catch up to Dani’s piercing run, the defender in blue eventually steamrolls through the Madrileño’s outstretched leg. PK given.

Whether the outcome is a darting run inside by Semedo, leading to a shot, cutback, or penalty–or simply a cross hit into wannabe-goalscorers–this corner dump move may have been an option to keep Osasuna’s backline guessing and force them to cover a bit more real estate. Below, see an adaptation of the same play from above, with “Messi” on the ball in yellow, and the progression of play that could’ve followed, had Semedo sprinted out of the cage.

As I’ve always found important to express to my attackers, the value, here, exists if the ball arrives to the run-maker or not. Vacating spaces allows for new opportunities to present themselves. In closed quarters, stagnation is your enemy.

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We might even note an example from another notorious one-footed leftie: Arjen Robben.

But as much as I might’ve enjoyed watching these exchanges unfold, they simply didn’t. Instead, Barcelona’s players attempted to mitigate the effects of the central inferiority via an alternative route. The thought process was simple, “if we’re down by one or two men in these spaces, and we wish to conquer them, let’s throw more bodies into the mix. We can outnumber them.”

With the help of a little hindsight bias, we’ll pretty quickly recognize that this could only make the problem worse.

Instead of gaining control in the tight areas, Barcelona simply stuffed their tiny openings and made them smaller. Soccer players often act as magnets, attracting opposing defenders to wherever the attackers go. Pique and Lenglet often pushed high in an effort to draw out the press, with the Frenchman making a handful of dribbling runs (and even mustering a near firecracker from distance), while Pique looked to make an impact as a second striker late on. Despite the welcome initiative, their efforts appeared to be in vain. For the more advanced players, by additional numbers between the Osasuna 2nd and 3rd lines, they only drew more defensive attention to these regions and congested it further.

Puig appeared to realize this and look to receive behind the moat, but upon comfortably collecting the ball, he was often faced with the harsh reality that he’d done little to advance Barca’s verticality. His agile gambetta yielded several threatening diagonal runs through enemy lines, as well as plenty of lofted through balls, but even the Academy starlet struggled to find the the golden play. On a day where the team’s most elegant chance was Riqui’s handcrafted chip to Messi, Puig’s slight mis-touch before poking the ball over the MMM meant the Argentine was offside by the skin of his shoulder. It was clear that even Barca’s most lively young talent needed to sharpen his blade.

With the others, Semedo’s complacent positioning, Braithwaite’s general look of hesitation, Firpo’s reluctance to threaten open halfspaces (more on that later), and so forth, meant that Barca lacked the necessary creativity or dynamism to chip away at the walls of the Osasuna jail. With steady repetitions of the same sequences throughout the game, Estupinian and Co. became increasingly confident in their ability to stymie the Azulgrana.

More on Le Cut Inside Men

So we’ve seen an example of Robben’s effectiveness, despite his predictability–but just how predictable were the Barcelona wingers on the day?

I’ll be honest. The number of times I had to check to make sure I didn’t use duplicate clips for this compilation was painful. It was almost automatic. Fati received, touched inside, laid it back off. Nearly every time, we saw one of the worlds’ top young wingers in a favorable and isolated 1v1 out wide, often with plenty of space in behind Nacho Vidal, who chose a conservative, negative pass instead. I’ll be the first to praise Ansu’ records and achievements, especially as a mere 17 year old, but man, this was frustrating to watch live and even more so to compile.

To clarify, the issue wasn’t solely perpetrated by Ansu–it extended to the fullbacks too. Firpo and Semedo more readily underlapped than overlapped, but as mentioned, the match required width, not further central congestion. We already know Messi favors his left foot from the rightside as well. Alba and Vidal also looked inside and negative multiple times. The clips above are merely a snapshot of a greater problem.

Halfspace Hesitance

In Pep Guardiola’s well-documented 20-zone system, the soccer pitch is divided into far more regions than is customarily seen. While many throughout history have emphasized the criticality of the zone right atop the 18 yard box, often dubbed “Zone 14”, Pep has promoted an alternative spacial deconstruction that places the biggest brownie points in the “halfspaces”. I’ve referred to them several times in this article, but what exactly are they?

The halfspaces are marked as the regions between wide flanks and the central region (in which the most goals are created). Geometrically speaking, the center allows for the greatest freedom of motion for any player on the ball, while the sidelines limit mobility the most. A winger or fullback must play with a boundary alongside them at all times, reducing the areas they’re able to explore or manipulate. It is for this very reason that quicker players tend to find themselves along the outskirts; their rapidity allows for more direct vertical translation, while slower, more meticulous distributors find their home towards the middle. Central players must have their heads on a constant swivel, updating their mental maps of the field all around them. Those on the right or left can position themselves with their hips open to the field, creating a near-perfect view of everything. As we’ve noticed in this match, width allows an attack to stretch an opposition defense. Central dominance allows them to switch from one side to another, and to overwhelm the opposition in soccer’s most valuable region, leading all the way up to the goal mouth.

The list of pros and cons is extensive, and I admittedly don’t know all of them, but one thing is for certain: the halfspace serves as the perfect mix between the two. Goal scoring crossed with defensive tugging means that many modern teams reserve these patches of turf for their most exquisitely creative players. The 10 typically calls the halfspace his home. David Silva and Kevin De Bruyne occupy these regions for Pep’s more recent Manchester City project. Check out the Spaniard’s crafty positioning between the lines and in the left halfspace in his recent assist vs. Bournemouth, below.

So why does this work so well?

One of the primary goals of attackers and creators is to force the opposition to make decisions. Comfortable defenders are at their best. Unpredictability breeds new and unfamiliar circumstances. If you hand someone a puzzle they’ve solved thousands of times, it’s unlikely to be a challenge, but if you provide them with something new, you’ll see what they’re really made of. By keeping defenders on their toes, they’re more likely to be forced into split-second cognitive overloads during the run of play, generating a higher likelihood of mistakes and misjudgments. Worst case, the imbued indecision will generate a delay in their reaction, leaving them momentarily uncommitted to any of the available options. Sometimes, the worst decision is to make no decision at all.

Thus, tricky players are ideal for these purposes. A 10 like David Silva is like a swiss army knife for cutting open defenses. He excels at sliding in between tight spaces, playing difficult slotted passes, and even scoring. The post-2010 Spanish world has seen a variety of these such players; Iniesta, Thiago, Cazorla, Isco, and by extension, Messi. The lingering question is where to position them to cause the biggest possible defensive headache.

If we theorize against a classical 4-4-2 setup, the advantage of playing through the halfspaces is easiest to grasp. With an opposing back four and two central midfielders, a team like Manchester City places David Silva and KDB at the center of a triangle, equidistant from the ballnear fullback, centerback, and trailing CDM. The lack of intuitiveness regarding who’s job it is to press the man on the ball is what makes the halfspace so wonderfully ideal to occupy. We end up with several situations, all of which are non-ideal:

1. The centerback steps up to press, closing down a shot and any further dribbling along a path direct to goal. This seems like the best approach, but the vacancy left in behind can also prove to be the most threatening if left unattended. As the CB commits, a shrewd striker will move into the space behind him, while most crafty 10s will manage to maneuver a through ball into that space. Some wingers may even recognize the pattern and dart in from the outside, cutting off the fullback. Sergio Ramos often steps to press creative players in these zones, and is usually quick to recover, but he has a tendency to get beat in behind after a quick layoff works its way around him.
2. The fullback steps in to press, hoping to avoid his CB’s departure from the most valuable region in need of protection. In this circumstance, a wide winger can find themselves with expansive grass to work with in the corner for a dribble inwards or a cross. He can be played to feet or into space.
3. The defensive mid retreats and applies pressure from behind, hoping to prevent any gaps opening up behind the line of defense at all, and to avoid being lost out of the play. This is the most conservative option, as the often clunkier midfielder will need to catch up to the agile 10, and unless he utilizes a crafty Nainggolan-esque hook tackle, he’ll be unable to easily put his body between the creator and his forward options. Tackling from behind is a usual suspect for fouls in these parts, too. The rise of freekick specialists has made it more of a risk than ever to haphazardly defend in the advanced halfspaces. Needless to say, it is often these CAMs that stroke deadballs over the wall and under the bar, rubbing a handful of ironic salt in the wounds of the foul-committing defender.

There truly are no good options! Hence, why these zones are so promising. And yet, even with a halfspace maestro like Messi, Barcelona seemed confusingly reluctant to zoom into them–even when the opportunity was handed to them on a silver platter.

The most egregious perpetrator was Junior Firpo. His tendency to underlap Fati out wide meant that he was often confronted with vast expanses of claimable halfspace turf. Osasuna’s cohesive overloading of the sides of the field, dragging nearly all of their players into the half of the pitch the ball was in, meant that upon rapid rotation, this vacancy was frequently his for the taking. The ballnear CMs would scramble to reposition, but the ball moves faster than any man can run–especially in a team like Barcelona. By the time the rock settled at Firpo’s feet, he looked like deer in the headlights. Repeatedly, he offloaded the ball wide, leaving Fati to dismiss his previous burnmarks and lay his hand flat on the inwards-touch-stove time and time again.

Barcelona tends to believe more in knocking the ball around, rather than driving with it in the passenger’s seat. But even in the days of midfield artists like Guardiola, Laudrup, Xavi, Iniesta, Busquets, and more, dribblers like R9, Ronaldinho, Eto’o, Henry, Neymar, Ibrahimovic, and Messi have proved that there can be advantages to both. My taking the ball yourself, you engage the opposition in a declaration of war. Patiently passing the ball can erode the opponent over time, but charging full speed ahead forces them to make a move and try to stop you. When a player receives la pelota in acres of space, but chooses not to take it, it tells the defenders that they’re afraid. An armyman who hesitates to leap out of the bunker and capture new territory is one that generals will rely on less and less. If you don’t take opportunities when they’re handed to you, when will you?

And while the bunker analogy isn’t bulletproof, this problem has emerged more problematically than ever for a struggling Barcelona. Players have shown a unified unwillingness to get in the mix, to provide a threat themselves, just because they know they have one of the all time greatest fighters alongside them. But even almighty Goliath was triumphed by a persistent David. If the initiative to gamble isn’t collective, the side becomes tremendously predictable. All these months of forcing the ball to Leo for late-game heroics has withered the confidence of his supporting cast. Instead of driving a spear into the heart of Osasuna’s precious halfspaces, Firpo and others feebly continued to play in non-threatening zones. Playing a man down and content with even a mere point, Los Rojillos watched the futile Azulgrana efforts until the match’s dying embers, where they surprised even themselves with the snatched victory.

An Off-Day for the Midfielders

Outnumbered in the middle of the park, Barcelona’s usually dominant MFs were lackluster on a day in which they were greatly needed to overcome their central inferiority. Rakitic proved to be the most frustrating of the bunch, appearing lethargic and even, at times, shying away from showing for the ball. Roberto was less of a catalyst than what we’ve seen in recent weeks. By virtue of needing to bring a risk-taking adventurousness to the tepid side, Arturo Vidal lost possession on quite a few occasions, too. Frenkie looked alright, but that sums it up. Busquets’ blunder late on is what granted Osasuna the victory. And so, while Osasuna’s central midfield was comprised of names I’d never heard of–they put in a resoundingly more impressive shift. See some key instances, below.

In case you needed any further convincing, Arthur’s sideline snooziness just about sums it up. A picture really is worth a thousand words. Shoutout to the Bein Sports production team for that one–let’s just hope they make comfy beds in Turin.

Los Rojillos’ Counterattacking Eagerness

The Catalans’ lack of energy and inspiration was only magnified by Osasuna’s eagerness and precision on the counter. With excellent layoff play to continue staggering the progression up the field, they seemed highly coordinated and gave Barcelona some trouble in keeping them at bay. Both goals came from moments in which the opposition defense was scrambling backwards, suggesting that their tactics may have been to avoid letting them set a block like the one they were so steadfast in assembling. The low line of confrontation they maintained throughout the match also meant that there was added pressure to execute on each of the few opportunities they had created.

The decision to commit to a counter vs. hold back is always a tough one; what if your team mistakenly loses possession, and now you’re out of position? But even in the moments in which this did occur, Barcelona failed to counter the comparatively disorganized Osasuna, with any remote alacrity. Instead, they regained their composure, let Osasuna get their ducks in a row, and continued to struggle to get through the MMM. Perhaps an adjustment in trying to attack quickly after Osasuna’s handful of downfield runs would’ve resulted in more space to break through. If Barca had been successful, Osasuna may have been less encouraged to commit men forward when they had chances, out of fear that Barcelona would strike while the iron was hot. Maybe this would’ve limited their contributions to the scoresheet.

But let’s dig deeper into this “staggering” effect. By taking two steps forward and one step back in counterattack, it leaves defenders with a variety of marking decisions that can create gaps onto which box-runners can penetrate. i.e. if a striker is pressed from behind and lays it off to the CAM, the centerback will have departed a dangerous zone in behind him, just like the halfspace marking scenario mentioned above. This general area can then be circumvented, and if the ST reacts faster than the CB, he can spin and look to advance into that region for an eventual re-reception and shot. Counterattacking is largely footrace-based, but this staggering movement is seen at all the top levels. Erling Haaland has shown several instances of this precise decision making for Dortmund this year–and I’ll be looking to further examine how he manipulates defenders, in a later article.

In the two examples shown below, note how aware Kike Barja, an Osasuna substitute, is with his back turned to goal, and how intelligently he plays the way he’s facing. Textbook.

An Adjustment: Deep Runs and Lobs over Top

As the second half wore on, Barcelona were forced to reinvent their attacking methodology, seeking to loft balls over the top onto deep runs, instead of playing through the Osasuna MMM. The change was a welcome one; it’s always delightful to watch Messi chip an inswinging dink over enemy lines and onto Jordi Alba’s peach of a run, but the sharpness and fluidity we so frequently associate with those plays was absent. Puig’s attempt from earlier marked an example, but Messi has made this type of pass one of his trademarks. The idea is to face inwards, threaten the opposition on the dribble, force a marking decision, often let the defensive line step up, and then play a sharp angled pass over them. The tactic has proven to be super effective against teams that look to crowd Barca out of the middle–like Osasuna.

Just like countering immediately after a counter, this type of move serves as what’s known in the field of psychology as operant conditioning through positive punishment. In other words, adding a stimulus that weakens a future response. Briefly consider a situation in which a child is receiving substandard grades in school. A parent can ground their kid to punish the bad behavior. This is “positive punishment”. There are also methods of reinforcement, or even negative punishment–in which a stimulus like a phone or video game console can be confiscated as a result of the shabby report card.

With this framework, if a backline knows Messi can pop it over their heads, they’ll be less inclined to step hard on him as a unit. The punishment of a ball being served up and over them discourages the future response of closing him down. In turn, Messi is offered more space to work in.

This is the same idea as encouraging your team to shoot from distance, in order to draw out an opposition; if the opponent doesn’t step, the shot is uncontested. This makes it easier for the shooter to get their angles right and lace a firecracker from distance. If the defenders jump to block it, they give in to the attacking team’s “true” goal, and are yanked out of their compact position. In the end, so long as the effort is on target and troubles the keeper, it’s a smart move either way. If your player scuffs the ball into the stands, it may serve the opposite purpose and encourage the backline to stay deep, thinking “let him shoot”. That, on the contrary, would be an example of positive reinforcement.

Final Thoughts

As a final note, Setien’s rotation has been hugely under scrutiny in recent weeks. Many were cheering at the sight of Puig and Ansu in the lineup, but somewhat disappointed as the minutes wore on. The important thing to consider here is that Quique is trying things. If the match had been won, sure, the title race would’ve been delayed by another few days, but in my opinion this experimentation is a good thing. Obviously, Messi’s cynical post-match presser saying “we have to blame ourselves for what went wrong” cast plenty of doubt over the team’s performance leading into the Champions League clash against Napoli, but his focus was on the players. I’d hesitate to offload the blame onto the coach for the personnel selections, even if they may have underperformed. Even Braithwaite could be seen making intelligent space-creating runs, whether it was his intention or not, and despite his technical shortcomings. Rakitic looked offbeat but had moments in which he made crucial professional fouls, or kept the metronome ticking. Ansu cut inside nearly every time but who knows, he may have gotten unlucky on a few of those dribbling sequences. After all, on 31 August 2019, in a game against this very Osasuna side, Fati became the youngest player ever to score a La Liga goal for FCB. He was aged just 16 years and 304 days. Sometimes, the execution is just off.

But at the and of a season, games like these are what define the year. While Barcelona lost to a midtable side, Real Madrid capitalized and kept marching on. These moments make a difference. A team looking to compete amongst Europe’s elite can’t afford a drop of complacency. After all, points totals in recent English Premier League title victories have been some of the highest ever. The margin for faltering is slimmer than ever.

Furthermore, if this inability to deliver, as Messi alludes to, becomes a habit, fans will lose patience. With early and disastrous UCL exits to Roma and Liverpool traumatizing recent memory, the pressure is on for the Naples fixture. August’s tournament format is single-legged and free of second chances; a slip like this can put an end to the Blaugrana’s hopes of compensating for their lackluster domestic season.

As I wrap things up, I want to thank you for getting this far! I hope my first official exposé has been able to shine some light on a few key difficulties Barca had on Matchday 37. Perhaps it’s given some indication as to how to frustrate this Catalan side, or what to look out for if playing a resolute Osasuna low block. Maybe Arthur’s yawn was all you needed.

I’ll admit that the act of studying this footage under the microscope has been very reflexively rewarding, too. As much as I hope to be providing value to any readers, I, too, am trying to train my eyes to better perceive nuances and details. As is with most things, I suppose, the harder you look, the more you tend to find. I’m happy that this game had so many interesting tidbits to examine–and I hope you enjoyed investigating them alongside me.

In the coming days and weeks I’ll look to continue. I’ve recorded some recent matches I’d like to take a look at, and I’m experimenting with trials of different analysis and telestration software, too. Feel free to let me know if you have any suggestions regarding my annotations, etc. All discussion, questions, and more are totally encouraged.

‘Till next time!